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VETERANS' LEGISLATION AND LIMITATIONS UPON
THE IMPLIED POWERS OF CONGRESS
ROBERT

T. DoNLEY*

The enactment of "veterans' legislation" by the Congress of
the United States, in all its various phases, is essentially a gift
in the form of money or services to a specially constituted minority of citizens. Since the source of the funds applied to such
purposes flows, by the incidence of taxation,' from the assets of
the people as a whole, the inquiry is at once suggested: upon what
theory is justified this collection from the many and donation to
the few? If, by hypothesis, all would agree that this is undemocratic, what is the basis for the exception to the general
theory? The power of Congress to enact such legislation seems
nevei to have been questioned. Perhaps it cannot be questioned
judicially for the want of a proper party protestant, but of this
more shall be said hereafter. The wisdom of such, legislation is,
however, seriously debated. It has become a political issue of
capital importance. For reasons later to be made apparent, it
ember of the Bar, Morgantown, West Virginia, and Lecturer in Law,
West Virginia University.
'No distinction is made in this article between pensions and other, forms
of reward. See People v. Westchester National Bank, 231 N. Y. 465, 132
N. E. 241 (1921). It is well settled that a pensioner has no vested legal
right in a pension; it is a bounty of the government which Congress has the
right to give, withold, distribute, or recall at its discretion. U. S. v. Teller,
107 U. S. 64, 2 S. Ct. 39 (1882); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 15
S. Ct. 586 (1894).
'See Judson, Public Purposes For Which Taxation is Justifiable (1908)
17 YALE L. J. 162, at 163: "Under the comprehensive revenue system of the
government, taxes are levied, not for specific purposes, but by continuing laws
establishing the rate of customs, duties and internal revenue taxes. Questions
relating to the lawful purposes of taxation, therefore, do not arise in the levying of Federal and State taxes, but in the appropriation of public funds for
public needs."

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1933

1

198

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1933], Art. 2
VETERANS' LEGISLATION AND LIMITATIONS

is impossible to dissociate the question of the wisdom of the laws
from the question of their constitutionality.
It is, therefore, the purpose of this article to inquire into
the origin and constitutional basis of the power of Congress to
enact veterans' legislation; and to discuss whether or not, conceding the existence of such power, it is unlimited.
No intelligent approach to these problems is possible without
a definition of terms and a knowledge of what legislation Congress has enacted and proposed. By "veterans' legislation" is
meant any form of gratuity to a former member of the military
or naval forces. Following the World War, Congress enacted a
series of laws for the benefit of veterans.
Only two of these
measures are of interest here: (a) that providing medical and
hospital care (in addition to compensation payments) which is
also available to veterans of the Spanish-American War, the
Philippine Insurrection, and the Boxer Rebellion.'
It is provided that these facilities shall be available to such veterans "suffering from neuropsychiatric or tubercular ailments and diseases,
paralysis agitans, encephalitis lethargica or amoebic dysentery, or
the loss of sight of both eyes regardless whether such ailments
or diseases are due to military service or otherwise . . . . The
director is further authorized ....
to furnish hospitalization and
necessary traveling expenses to veterans of any war, military occupation, or military expedition since 1897, not dishonorably discharged without regard to the nature or origin of their disabilities." And (b) adjusted compensation, commonly called the
'bonus
The legislative history of the latter measure is still in the
process of being written. Public discussion of the matter has
been so thorough that there would seem to be no occasion for an
extended statement of its provisions.' It is essentially a twentyyear endowment insurance policy, payable at death or in 1945,
838 U. S. C. A., § 484, (1926), cited as "World War Veterans' Act, 1924".
'38 U. S. C. A., § 591, (1926), cited as "'World War Ajusted Compensation
Act".
5
See generally articles by Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines, Administrator of
Veterans' Affairs, The Soldiers' Bonus, The New York Times, September 11,
1932, See. 2, p. El; Angell, The Veterans Versus The Country (1932) 165
HARPE's MAGAZINE 257; Watson, Millions For Defense (1932) 88 THE
FoRum AND CFNTURY 183; Alfred E. Smith, Veterans and Taxpayers (1932)
205 THE SATURDAY EVENING POST 3.

Mr. Angell's article states that "during 1931, 988,000 medical examinations
were made, 140,000 cases were treated and 76,000 men admitted to hospitals.
Less than 25 percent of the patients admitted were suffering from a disability
growing out of war service." Further, "Honest officials of the Veterans' Ad-
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on which the United States pays the premiums. Representative
Patman introduced a bill6 providing for the immediate payment
in treasury notes, of the full face value of the certificates. The
bill directed the Secretary of the Treasury to issue such notes to
the extent required and place them in Federal Reserve Banks
subject to the order of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs.
The Secretary was further directed to issue a like amount of
United States bonds, bearing three and a half per cent interest,
payable in twenty years from the date of issue.
These bonds
were to be deposited in the Federal Reserve Banks, to be sold to
the public from time to time. The currency received from the
sale of the bonds was then to be exchanged for the Treasury notes
issued in payment of the certificates.
The Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, submitted an adverse report." A supplemental adverse
report8 and a minority report0 favorable to the bill were filed. The
Senate Committee on Finance also reported adversely.' The bill
passed the House but was defeated in the Senate.
A statistical analysis of expenditures made under direction
of veterans' legislation as a whole shows that the United States
has already paid out approximately $6,000,000,000.00 on account
of veterans of the World War, as against $8,000,000,000.00 for
veterans of all other wars.' It is estimated that under existing
legislation the total expenditure for World War Veterans will
reach $21,500,000,000.00.? The United States is now expending
for the benefit of all veterans approximately $1,000,000,000.00 a
year, or nearly one-fourth of the total expenditures of the Government.3 The Patman bill would call for the issue of $2,400,000,00.00 of Treasury notes, since there are no other funds available.
In addition, the deficit of the Government for the fiscal year 1932
ministration admit that thousands today are receivng monthly gratuities for
absurd, exaggerated, and made-out-of-whole-cloth 4disabilities'."
Mr. Watson states that "These three items, national defense, debt service.
and balm for veterans, making up the nation's continuing outlay for past and
future wars, now represent in toto just short of 70 percent of our annual
ependitures. '
OH. R. 7726, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.
7
8 H. R. Rep. No. 1257, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.
Tbid., Part 3, May 13, 1932, submitted by Mr. Lewis.
0
Ibid., Part 2, May 13, 1932, submitted by Mr. Vinson.
"Sen. Rep. No. 834, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.
n Supra n. 7 at 2.
"Ibid.

" Supra n. 10 at 4.
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will amount to more than $2,800,000,000.00,"' as a result of the
most drastic economic depression in our history.
In support of the Patman bill it was urged (a) that the
debt evidenced by the certificates was a moral obligation which'
should be paid by a grateful government; (b) that the distribution of $2,400,000,000.00 would tend to increase both the volume
and the velocity of money and operate to revive business; (c) that
many of the veterans were in urgent need of the funds; and (d)
that the Treasury notes were not "fiat" money."
In opposition it was stated (a) that immediate payment was
contrary to the terms of the contract; (b) that no appreciable benefit
would result to business in general; (c) that only thirty per cent
of the veterans were in actual need; (d) that the proposed
Treasury notes would be "fiat" or "paper" money, the issuing of
which would set a dangerous precedent; and (e) that in the
present condition of the Treasury disastrous financial results would
flow from the added burden.'
The foregoing summary has been presented, not for the purpose of questioning the wisdom of legislation past and proposed,
but as a necessary preface to the questions: By what constitutional delegation of power is the Congress authorized to expend a
total of some $14,000,000,000.00 for the benefit of veterans of all
wars? For the expenditure of one-fourth of the total national
income for such purposes? For the issuance of "fiat" rhoney, if
it be such? And, finally, to inquire whether, assuming the existence of delegated power for such purposes, it is an unlimited
power without relation to the degree or extent of its exercise, or
to time and circumstances. Whether or not existing and proposed
legislation has now reached the point where the solvency of the
United States Government is endangered, is a matter of opinion.
Assume, however, that in the future legislation is enacted which
requires not one-fourth, but one-half, or three-fourths of the national income, for such purposes. Assume, further, that payment cannot be made pursuant to any sound fiscal policies, and
that in the opinion of all qualified observers insolvency of the
government is certain to result. In such a situation, is the power
of Congress unlimited?
15

Supra n. 9, at 1-9.
,sSupra
n. 7 and 8.
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ConstitutionalBasis of the Power
It is axiomatic that the powers of Congress are limited by the
Constitution to those specifically enumerated therein. There cannot be found an enumerated power to grant pensions, provide
for disabilities or death, or to confer gratuities on veterans of past
wars. None of the legislation referred to is specifically authorized.
It is apparent, therefore, that the power must be derived
from the only other conceivable source: the implied power to enact all laws "necessary and proper" to carry into execution the
enumerated powers."
This theory, apparently never seriously
questioned, is advanced in United States v. Hall,' implied power
being derived from the express powers to declare war, to raise and
support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and the like.
As if doubtful whether the argument carried complete conviction, Mr. Justice Clifford continued with the statement that
the power to grant pensions could not be controverted, since it
had been exercised by the States and by the Continental Congress
during the Revolutionary War, and the exercise of the power "is
coeval with the organization of the Government under the present
Constitution." If such legislation is to be justified by resort to
pre-constitutional history, the argument is valid only to the extent that such history supports it. But a reliable study of the
subject discloses no warrant for the inference that either the
States or the Continental Congress, prior to the adoption of the
Constitution, granted pensions or allowances for disabilities or
death suffered witiwut regard to service origin; nor for gratuities
not offered to induce enlistment and continuation of service.?
1'U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18: "To make all laws which shall be
necessarsy and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof."
Is98 U. S. 343, 29 L. ed. 180 (1879). The court said: "Implied power
in Congress to pass laws to define and punish offenses (relating to pension
funds) is also derived from the constitutional grant to Congress to declare
war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to mahe
rules for the land and naval forces, and to provide for organizing armies and
disciplining the militia and for governing such parts of them as may be
employed in the public service. Like implied authority is also vested in
Congress from the power conferred to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
places purchased, by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and
other needful buildings, and from the clause empowering Congress to pass
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, jor any department or officer therof."
"IGlasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States (1918) passim.
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As early as 1592 England enacted the first statute "for the
reliefe of Souldiours". ° By the eighteenth century the practice
of granting pensions was well established and "it was natural
that the English colonists in America should provide for the relief and support of their soldiers injured in wars with the Indians
In 1636 the Plymouth Colony
or with colonists of other nations.'
enacted in their court that " 'if any man shalbee sent forth as
a souldier and shall return maimed hee shalbee majntained competently by the Collonie during his life.' "' But, with the background of colonial precedent "it is to be noted that the disabled
pensioner was required to be incapable of earning a livelihood. '
The first national pension law was enacted by the Continental Congress on August 26, 1776.4 On May 15, 1778, there was
enacted a law providing that "officers who served until the end
of the war should receive half pay for seven years after its conelusion. This allowance was not to exceed the half pay of a
Non commissioned officers and privates who should
colonel ....
serve to the end of the war were promised a further reward of
eighty dollars at its termination." '
The theory of such legislation was not to confer a gratuity
in recognition of past services, but was for the purpose of preventing wholesale resignations. It was thought necessary in order
to keep the army together. In a letter written by Washington
on May 18th to the President of Congress he stated: " 'I shall
announce the resolution of the 15th to the army, and would flatter myself it will quiet in a great measure the uneasinesses, which
have been so extremely distressing, and prevent resignations,
which had proceeded, and were likely to be at such a height, as
to destroy our-whole military system.' "
There was great objection to the plan thus put into operation. The Massachusetts legislature, in July, 1783, remonstrated
to Congress that the act was " 'inconsistent with that equality
which ought to subsist among citizens of free and republican
States' " and " 'calculated to raise and exalt some citizens in
- Ibid.,
"Ibid.,
=Ibid.,
Ibid.,
"Ibid.,
Ibid.,

at
at
at
at
at
at

9.
13.
14.
17.
20.
29-30.

Ibid., quoted at 30.
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wealth and grandeur, to the injury and oppression of others.' I'
A protest was likewise filed by the Connecticut House of Representatives, in which the upper house refused to join.' Professor
Glasson's conclusion is that while invalid-pension provisions were
in harmony with colonial precedent, public opinion was opposed
to officers' half-pay legislation, and "the thought of the existence
in the country after the war of a privileged class of service-pensioners was very repugnant to advocates of democracy".'
In so far, therefore, as the argument in United States v.
Hall rests upon colonial precedent, it offers no support for the
theory that Congress has power to award compensation for disabilities or death not incurred as a result of service, or to grant
pensions not offered as an inducement to enlistment or continuation of service. The granting of adjusted compensation and nonservice-connected disability awards and hospitalization must, it
is submitted, rest upon the implication of power under the "necessary and proper" clause,' rather than upon pre-constitutional
precedent.
It may be noted in passing that the power of the states has
been questioned upon the ground that such disbursements were
not for a "public purpose". However, it is apparently settled
that a state or municipal corporation may offer bounties to induce
service in the military forces of the nation.' They may also expend public funds for the purpose of reimbursing those, who, on
the faith of the public credit and with the expectation of repayment, have advanced money toward a public fund with which to
One group of authorities holds that a
procure enlistments.'
ibid., quoted at 48.
Ibid., at 46-47.
dIbi.,
pp. 51-52.
"OMr. Justice Clifford, in United States v. Hall, supra n. 18, further elaborated the argument: "Even the respondent admits that Congress may.declare
war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; and it is
equally clear that Congress may make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying the powers granted by the Constitution into execution.
Concede that, and it follows that Congress may grant such donations to the
officers, soldiers and seamen employed in such public service. Bounties may
be offered to promote enlistments, and pensions to the wounded and disabled
may be promised as like inducements. Past services may also be compensated,
and pensions may also be granted to those who were wounded, disabled or
otherwise rendered invalids while in the public service, even in cases where
no prior promise was made or antecedent inducement held out.)
9 (1866); Henderson v. Lagow, 42 Ill. 360
3Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill.
(1866); State v. Baltimore, 52 Md. 398 (1879).
Cass Township v. Dillon, 16 Oh. St. 38 (1864); Freeland v. Hastings, 10
Allen 570 (Mass., 1865).
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state may provide a bounty for past services, as a pure gratuity,
in recognition of sacrifices made during the war.' Opposed to
them is the view that if, at the time of entering the service, there
was no offer or promise of bounty, a pure gratuity is unconstitutional as authorizing the expenditure of public money for a private purpose.'
In People v. Westchester National BanVF the question arose
under a New York statute providing for the issue of $45,000,000.00 of state bonds, the proceeds of which were to be expended
as a bonus to soldiers and sailors of the World War. The court
stated that "whether the purpose is a public one, therefore, is no
longer the sole test as to the proper use of the State's credit."
It was said that they were gifts because not made in recognition
of a claim, moral or equitable, against the state, on the ground
that the state took no part in calling the soldiers and sailors into
service and received no benefit not common to all other states. It
was, therefore, held that the statute violated the constitutional
provision that "neither the credit nor the money of the state shall
be given or loaned to or in aid of any association, corporation or
other private undertaking."
But more important for present
purposes was the statement that:
.... ifthere is any reasonable ground for the legislative
decision that a moral obligation exists, the courts may not
intervene. If there is such a ground, the legislature must
determine whether the claim shall be recognized. But the
prohibitions of the Constitution may not be evaded by the
assertion that such an obligation exists, when in fact it does
not. Arbitrary action may not convert a wrong into a
right."
Franklin v. State Examiners, 23 Cal. 173 (1863); Leonard v. Wiseman,
31 Md. 201 (1869); Opinion of Justices, 211 Mass. 608, 98 N. E. 338 (1912);
Gustafson v. Rhinow, 144 Mian. 415, 175 N. W. 903 (1920); State ez rel.
Hart v. Clausen, 118 Wash. 114, 194 Pac. 793 (1921); State ex rel. Atwood
v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 176 N. W. 224 (1920); 170 Wis. 251, 175 N. W.
589 (1919).
"Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 82 Ati. 1030 (1912); Mead v. Acton,
139 Mass. 341, 1. N. E. 413 (1885); In re Bounties to Veterans, 186 Mass.
603, 72 N. E. 95 (1904); Bush v. Orange County, 159 N. Y. 212, 53 N. X.
1121 (1899); Washington County v. Berwick, 56 Pa. 466 (1869).
"231 X. Y. 465, 132 N. E. 241 (1921). Cf. Veterans' Welfare Board v
Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678 (1922), wherein the court states: "Th6
promotion of patriotism is recognized as a proper exercise of governmental
functions and as a field for the expenditure of public money. We think, then,
that this legislation may be justified upon the proposition that it is in furtherance of the general welfare by promotion of patriotism, and that the classification made is justifiable upon that basis." In that case the statute provided
for free text-books, transportation and sustenance to World War veterans
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The "Necessary and Proper" Clause
The leading case of McCullough v. Maryland' involved the
power of Congress to create a Bank of the United States. Chief
Justice Marshall urged that the clause should receive a broad construction, in accordance with the supposed intention of the framers
of the Constitution. It is difficult to accede to this argument in
so far as it turns upon the use of positive rather than negative
phraseology. To delegate a power to do whatever is necessary
and proper is, unless the words be meaningless, to imply that
what is unnecessary and improper is beyond the scope of the grant.
The Chief Justice continued with the statement which has since
been quoted many times:
"We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended . . . . Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
It was further stated that in determining whether the means
chosen are appropriate the court may inquire whether the proposed law is really calculated to carry into effect any express
power granted to Congress.'
What, then, is the effect of the clause? Marshall answered
that ". . . . if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures
to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government. )'
while attending a state institution of learning. See also Veterans' Welfare
Board v. Jordan, 189 Cal. 124. 208 Pac. 284 (1922).
c14 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819). The reasoning was that: "If, then,
their (the framers of the Constitution) intention had been, by this clause, to
restrain the free use of means which might otherwise have been implied, that
intention would have been inserted in another place, and would have been
expressed in terms resembling these. 'In carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all others,' etc. 'No laws shall be passed but such as are necessary and proper.' Had the intention been to make this clause restrictive, it
would unquestionably have been so in form as well as in effect."
m" But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect
any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire
into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes
the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such power."1
mMadison also seems to have taken this view. See THE FEDEaAT ST (1788)
No. XLIV, in which it is said: "Had the Constitution been silent on this
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As to express powers exercised directly, the authority of Congress is unlimited. In principle it cannot be otherwise for the
reason that sovereign power to perform certain sovereign acts
must, in the nature of all governments, be lodged irretrievably,
irreviewably, somewhere. We have seen fit to place this
sovereignty in Congress. But when express powers are exercised
by the method of indirection, sovereignty is not unlimited but on
the contrary is granted with the proviso that the indirect methods
shall be only such as are necessary and proper. It logically follows, therefore, that any act of Congress which attempts to carry
out an express power by legislation which is unnecessary and improper, is unconstitutional. The only question for determination
is: who shall judge of the necessity and propriety of the act Congress itself or the Supreme Court of the United States?' It
seems strange that the question could be debatable. Conceding,
since Marbury v. Madison," the power and duty of the Court to
declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, is that duty any the less
when Congress enacts a law which, in the judgment of the Court,
is unnecessary and improper ? If this be not true, one may paraphrase Marshall's celebrated inquiry in the latter case, asking to
what purpose limitations are imposed and those limitations committed to writing if they may at any time be exceeded by those intended to be restrained? If Congress may in all cases reply that
it is the sole judge of the necessity and propriety of its legislation, then theoretically there is no legal limitation upon its powers.
At any rate, the question was not settled by Mcdulloughi v. Maryland.' Perhaps it was settled, for the time being, by a series of
cases following the civil war.
head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as meaiis
of executing the general powers would have resulted to the government, by
unavoidable implication. *No axiom is more clearly established in liw, or in
Teason, than that wheiever the'end is required, the means are' autho-ized;
wherevdr a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included."
"ISee n. 38, supra. Madison said: "If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution,
and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same
as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as
if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these
were to be violated; the same, in short, as if the State legislature should
violate their respective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the
success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the
last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can, by the
election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers."
1 Cranch 137, 5 L. ed 137 (1803).
'"Supra n. 36.
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The Legal Tender Cases
On February 25, 1862, Congress enacted a law authorizing
the issue of $150,000,000.00 of its own notes, and provided that
they should be legal tender for all debts, public and private, with
certain exceptions. Mrs. Hepburn tendered such notes to Griswold in payment of a debt which had become due five days before
the passage of the law. This gave rise to the first of the legal
&
' The Court held the act untender cases, Hepburn v. Griswold.
constitutional. The argument ran in this wise: there is no clause
in the Constitution vesting in Congress the power to make "any
description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts."
It was conceded that Congress has power to enact laws " ...
not absolutely necessary indeed, but appropriate, plainly adapted
to constitutional and legitimate ends; laws not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution; laws
really calculated to effect objects intrusted to the government."
But, "not every Act of Congress, then, is to be regarded as the
supreme law of the land; nor is it by every act of Congress that
the judges are bound. This character and this force belong only
to such acts as are 'made in pursuance of the Constitution.' "
Accordingly, it was held that the making of such notes legal tender was not an "appropriate" means to carry out the express
power to coin money, nor to carry on war, nor to regulate commerce, nor to borrow money. Congress was not the sole judge
Justices
of the necessity and propriety of its chosen means.'
Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented."
Wall. 603, 19 L. ed. 513 (1869).
The strength of the argument is best shown by the language of the Court:
"It (the argument) carries the doctrine of implied powers very far beyond
any extent hitherto given to it. It asserts that whatever in any degree promotes an end within the scope of a general power, whether, in the correct
sense of the word, appropriate or not, may be done in the exercise of an
implied power.
"Can this proposition be maintained?
"It is said that this is not a question for the Court deciding a cause, but
for Congress exercising the power. But the decisive answer to this is that
the admission of a legislative power to determine finally what powers have
the described relation as means to the execution of other powers plainly
granted, and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question,
in cases involving private rights, the powers thus determined to have that
relation, would completely change the nature of American government . . . ..
"Undoubtedly among means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated,
the legislature has unrestricted choice. But there can be no implied power
to use means not within the description."
"The dissenting opinion took the position that: "It (the majority view)
would authorize this court to enforce theoretical views of the genius of the
government, or vague notions of the Spirit of the Constitution and of abstract
428
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Following a change in the personnel of the Court, the views
of the minority in the preceding case were upheld in the Legal
Tender Cases," which overruled Hepburn v. Griswold. The Court
was not convinced that the means adopted was inappropriate,
and decided that the judgment of Congress must stand. However, even Mr. Justice Strong's opinion seems to concede the existence of power in the Supreme Court to declare an act unconstitutional upon the ground of inappropriateness.'
Chief
Justice Chase, dissenting, so understood the position of the
majority," and urged that if it be "admitted that the legislature
is the sole judge of the necessity for the exercise of such powers,
the government becomes practically absolute and unlimited."
Mr. Justice Clifford also filed an illuminating dissenting opinion,"
but perhaps the most lucid exposition of the minority view was
stated by Mr. Justice Field, whose language cannot be bettered:"
"The utility of a measure is not the subject of judicial
cognizance, nor, as already intimated, the test of its constitutionality. But the relation of a measure as a means to an
end, authorized by the Constitution, is a subject of such
cognizance, and the test of its constitutionality, when it is
not prohibited by an specific provision of that instrument
and is consistent with its letter and spirit."
justice, by declaring void laws which did not square with those views. It
substitutes our ideas of policy for judicial construction, an undefined code
of ethics for the Constitution, and a court of justice for the National legislature.'
"12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1870).
"'"Before we can hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional, we must be
convinced that they were not appropriate means, or means conducive to the
execution of any or all of the powers of Congress, or of the government, not
appropriate in any degree (for we are not judges of the degree of appropriateness), or we must hold that they were prohibited......It is not to be
denied that acts may be adapted to the exercise of lawful power, and appropriate to it, in seasons of exigency, which would be inappropriate at other
times."
"''We
agree, then, that the question whether a law is a necessary and
proper means to execution of an express power, within the meaning of these
words as defined by the rule-that is to say, a means appropriate, plainly
adapted, not prohibited but consistent,-is a judicial question ......
Whether the means actually employed in a given case are such or not the
court must decide. The court must judge of the fact, Congress of the degree

of necessity.I"

..... Congress, in passing laws to carry express powers granted into
execution, cannot select any means as requisite for that purpose or as fairly
applicable to the attainment of the end, which are precluded by restrictions
or exceptions contained in the Constitution, or which are contrary to the
essential ends of political society "
"He also stated: "The position that Congress possesses some undefined
power to do anything which it may deem expedieit, as a resulting power
from the general purposes of the government, which is advanced in the
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He was of the opinion that the necessary and proper clause
neither augmented nor diminished the expressly designated powers
of Congress, and, in this he seems to have been supported by
Madison in The Federalist.' Mr. Justice Field again dissented
in the last of the series of legal tender cases, Julliard v. Green-

Mazn.rl
The conclusion to be reached from these cases seems to be
that Congress is the sole judge of the economic, political, or social necessity which may require legislation upon a given subject. But whether or not the specific legislation decided upon in
order to meet the necessity is a legitimate means, a means appropriate, plainly calculated to accomplish the object, is a judicial
question.
In Adair v. Thaited Statese the decision turned upon the
question whether a Congressional act making it a crime against
the United States for an agent of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of the latter's membership in a labor
organization, was necessary and proper in order to carry out
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.'
The
Court held that it was not; that "there is no such connection between interstate commerce and membership in a labor organization" as to authorize the act. "Any rule prescribed for the conduct of interstate commerce, in order to be within the competency
of Congress .....
must have some real or substantial relation to
or connection with the commerce regulated."
opinion of the majority, would of course settle the question under consideration without difficulty, for it would end all controversy by changing our
government from one of enumerated powers to one resting in the unrestrained
will of Congress."
Supra n. 38.
110 U. S. 421, 4 S. Ct. 122 (1883). Contemporary discussion of the
Legal Tender Cases discloses a diversity of opinion. See Hare, The Legal
Tender Decisions (1871) 10 Am. L. REG. (n. s.) 73; in which the writer says:
"If a power can be valid under any circumstances, the question whether it
is appropriate to the existing circumstances is political not legal, and does
not belong to the judicial province. See also: Chamberlain, The 'Legal
Tender' Decision of 24 (1884) 18 Am. L. REv. 410, wherein it is contended
that ," .....
when . . . . a 'necessity', as Marshall called it, does exist or
arise, the degree of the existing exigency or necessity is left to the judgment
of Congress. Let us clear our minds of confusion here, if possible. Granting
for the purpose of this argument, that an appropriate means to carry into
execution any constitutional power, is itself constitutional, or granting that in
an exigency or under a necessity, Congress miy make paper a legal tender, to
whom is the decision upon the appropriateness of the means or the existence
of an exigency or necessity, committed? To Congress? Judge Gray says yes.
Judge Marshall does not say yes, but by necessary implication, says no. And
if not to Congress, to whom? Necessarily to the courts."
208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ot. 277 (1907). Mr Justice Harlan clearly enunciated
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W
' there was involved the
Again, in United States v. Harris
constitutionality of an act of Congress making it a criminal offense for two or more persons in any state or territory to conspire or go in disguise upon the highway or on the premises of
another for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges or
immunities under the laws. It was contended that such legislation was a necessary and proper means of carrying out the provisions of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of section 2 of article IV of the Constitution. The Court
overruled this contention.

The Application of The Principle To Veterans' Legislation
In the light of McCullough v. Maryland and subsequent
cases, veterans' legislation must conform to these principles: the
end must be legitimate and it must be within the scope of the
Constitution. As to this there can be little question. The end
Ttheoretically), sought to be achieved is the carrying out of the
express powers to raise and support armies and to provide and
maintain a navy.' The means whereby this end is to be accomplished must be appropriate, plainly adapted to achieve the end,
really calculated to accomplish the end, not prohibited by the
Constitution, and consistent with its letter and spirit. Does the
the judicial power to determine the matter: "Of course, as has been often
said, Congress has a large discretion in the selection or choice of the means
to be employed in the regulation of interstate commerce, and such discretion
is not to be interfered with except where that which is done is in plain violation
of the Constitution. "2
1106
U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 106 (1882). The court said: "4 ....
the government of the United States is one of delegated, limited and enumerated
powers (citing cases). Therefore every valid act of Congress must find in
the Constitution some warrant for its passage ..... 1 "Mr. Justice Story,
in big Commentaries on the Constitution says: 'Whenevei, therefore, a question
arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the first question
is whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question
is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be whether it is
properly an incident to an express power and necessary to its execution. If
it be, then it may be exercised by Congress. If not, Congress cannot exercise it."
'Cf. Madison, op. cit. supra, n. 38: "Had the convention attempted a
positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their
other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest
of laws on every subject to which the constitution relates; accommodated too,
not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which
futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the
particular powers, which are the means of attaining the object of the general
power, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly
varied whilst the object remains the same."
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enacted and proposed veterans' legislation meet these requirements ? It is submitted that it does not in so far as it confers
benefits because of disabilities wholly unconnected with war
services. The attempt to demonstrate any logical connection between the end (the raising and supporting of armies) and the
means (the conferring of benefits for disabilities unconnected
with such raising and supporting) must fail. It is a pure rationalization, without foundation in the reality of any factual
connection. Congress has expended millions of dollars derived
from the people as a whole in conferring benefits, specific in
character and having no tendency to promote the welfare of the
nation in entirety, upon a specially selected, limited class. This
expenditure has not even a remote tendency, in fact, to assist
Congress in carrying out the express power to raise and support
armies. The explanation of this phenomenon is that Congress has
chosen, for reasons deemed at least politically sufficient, to select
this particular class as the objects of its bounty. So far as this
writer can ascertain no Congressman has ever suggested that the
measure was for the purpose of assisting Congress in carrying
its express power into execution. No declaration of such a purpose, had it been made, can alter the fact that there is no logical
or realistic connection between the two. No reason is perceived
why such a method of procedure could not be carried to even more
palpably extreme situations. If, by mere legislative fiat, Congress
may declare a means to be related to an end when as a matter
of fact it has no such relation, there is no limit which might be
set. Congress could confer pensions on aged employees of manufacturers engaged in the production of goods moving in interstate
commerce. It might establish a workmen's compensation fund
for the benefit of all laborers injured while employed in the
building of post offices or post roads. Examples are limited only
by the powers of imagination.
The constitutionality of adjusted compensation has a firmer
looting. The theory of the bonus is that it is compensation for
services rendered,' equalizes differences between the veteran's
pay and the high wages received by non-combatants,' and has a
'United States v. Hall, supra, n. 18; see also, United States v. Fairchilds,
25 Fed. Cas. 1035, No. 15,067 (1867); United States v. Marks, 26 Fed.
Cas. 1162, No. 15,721 (1869).
1 For example, see Remarks of Hon. Ewin L. Davis, in the House of
Representatives, March 23, 1922.
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tendency to promote patriotism." Admitting that there is some
logical, factual connection between such adjustments and the
power to raise and support armies, is the amount and nature of
such payment unlimited?
Limitations of Degree
When one of the states of the Union exercises its powers to
interfere with private rights, the Supreme Court of the United
States has quite definitely held that limitations of degree do exist.'
Whatever may be the power of Congress, Chief Justice
Marshall said in Brown v. Maryland' that "questions of power
do not depend on the degree to which it may be exercised. If it
may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those
in whose hands it is placed."
Professor Corwin's view is that "the attitude of the Court
nowadays, where it has to deal with state legislation, is very different. It takes the position that abuse of power, in relation to
private rights or to commerce, is excess of power and hence demands to be shown the substantial effect of legislation, not its
mere formal justification.'''
In accordance with familiar principles, a state statute must be tested by its operation and effect.
This argument is a pure rationalization. The tendency is probably to the
direct opposite. For example, see Alfred E. Smith's article supra, n. 5, wherein
it is said: "It is, to say the least, a bit discouraging to the youth of the
country to think that the high and idealistic patriotism spoken of during the
time o the war is sought to be cashed in dollars and cents when the war is
over by a small percentage of the people, who, in the height and glory of the
situation calling for the defense of the flag and the principles for which it
stands, were ready to take their place beside Nathan Hale, who regretted that
he had only one life to give for his country "'
See also President Hoover's veto message, returning House Bill No. 17054,
71st Congress, 3rd Session: "The patriotism of our people is not a material
thing. It is a spiritual thing. We cannot pay for it with Government aid.
We can honor those in need by our aid. And it is a fundamental aspect of
freedom among us that no step should be taken which burdens the Nation with
a privileged class who can care for themselves."
6See Breck P. McAllister, Public Purposes in Taxation (1930) 18 CA,.
L. REV. 137: "To say that the legislation is justified by 'the peculiar situation in the State' is to serve notice that the Court is prepared, if it is so
minded, to confine the decision closely within its particular facts. It is a
warning that what has been done is not a reliable barometer of what may be
done in the future. But it goes further. It is a mode of decision and as
such warrants analysis. It means that the Court is not disposed to say that
the legislation is unreasonable in view of the situation. That still enables the
Court to say that a given enactment is unreasonably related to the situation.
Given the 'peculiar situation' the particular legislation may go too far in
dealing with it. This still enables the Court to say that there is no 'particular
situation. "'
5912 Wheat. 419, 12 L. ed. 419 (1827).
0Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution (1919) 143.
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In setting limits to the degree to which a state may go in interfering with private rights, the Court does not seem to pass upon the wisdom of the legislation, for the decision can always be
rationalized by resorting to some fundamental guarantee of rights
of person or property. No one doubts to-day that the Court does
pass upon the wisdom!' of legislation thus evolving "American
'legalism', that curious infusion of politics with jurisprudence,
that mutual consultation of public opinion and established principles.''
This method of solution is not applicable to veterans'
legislation for the reason that, conceding a Congressional abuse of
power, no specific person's rights are taken away. The injury
results to an aggregate of individuals constituting the nation,
each of whom contributes an infinitesimal share to the assets of
the government. We are, therefore, confronted with legislation
which a court might believe unwise, yet which lacks the necessary
rationalizing element.'
But a distinction must clearly be taken between the exercise
of express and implied powers. Express power is necessarily unlimited. For example, the power to declare war could never be
abrogated, nor could a declaration of war be held unconstitutional on the ground that it meant certain disaster for the nation.
However, as to implied powers, we have the qualifications of
necessity and propriety, which, by very definition carry with them
the concept of abuse which arises from lack of necessity and impropriety.
The question is thus raised whether there is any logical distinction which can be supported on a realistic basis between legislation on the one hand which is not "proper" because not plainly adapted to achieve the end, and legislation, on the other hand,
which is not "proper" because of the particular economic and
social circumstances existing at the time. It is submitted that
"See MeBain, The Living Constitution (1928) 160; Charles A. Beard,
AunoAxR , GOVERN1mENT AND PoITIcs (5th ed. 1930) 297: "Although the
courts, in declaring a law void, seldom depart from the serene and austere
logic of the law, they do in fact pass judgment upon the political wisdom of
the measure under scrutiny ..... Phrases such as 'necessary and proper'
....
may be interpreted in many ways according to the theories, prejudices,
and preconceptions of the judges ....
*What the judges really do in most
cases, leaving all quibbling aside, is to say whether they believe a particular
act of Congress or state law is wise or not ..... that is, wise according to
their notion of wisdom."
I Supra n. 60, at 197.
1" 'Legal truth is bound to appear strictly logical in form even where in
the nature of things it cannot really be so' ". Wurzel, Juridical Thinking
418, quoted in Merriam, Aurmcnx PoLifIoAL IDEAs (1923) 152.
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there is none. The Patman bill for immediate cash payment of
the bonus has been attacked upon the ground that it would result in placing such an insupportable burden upon the Treasury
as to threaten the entire credit structure of the nation." It is
further said that the proposed Treasury notes are "fiat" or paper
money, and that their issuance would result in untold damage to
the stability of the currency.' As to the validity of these arguments no opinion is here expressed. Assuming, however, that
reasonable minds could not differ, that all economic experts were
of one opinion, and that without doubt the enactment. of the Patman bill would result in consequences so serious as to threaten
the stability of the government itself, does Congress have the
power, notwithstanding, to pass it?
Tested by the principles
previously set forth, it is submitted that such legislation should
be held unconstitutional.
The law must find its justification as a proper means to accomplish the end, the carrying out of power to raise and support
armies. Nowhere in the debates of Congress upon the Patman
bill can be found direct mention of that purpose. The issuance
of the Treasury notes in immediate payment is supported by advocates of the bill upon the ground that the currency needs inflation or reflation. Mr. Vinson's report for the minority states
that the bill should be passed "only if it can be done advantageously to the United States and to the betterment of the economic status of the country.'"
Then comes this statement of the
true object and purpose of the bill:
"There is a congestion of money and a paralysis of circulation, due to hoarding, and consequently a lack of sufficient
active currency to carry on the normal volume of business.
More money in circulation is needed and the payment of the
Supra n.10, at 5: "The effect of the resort by this Government to legal
tender notes upon its financial affairs and also upon the business economy
of the Nation would be disastrous."
See also testimony of Ogden L. Mills,
Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and
Means, 72d Congress, on Payment of Adjusted Compensation Certificates, p.
615: "Secretary Mills ..... .I
would not be concerned about a deficit
in a single year, even a deficit of $900,000,000. I would not like it, but I
would not be seriously concerned about it. But I think when, on top of a
deficit of $900,000,000, it becomes apparent that you have another deficit of
$2,500,000,000, at least, and then on top of the $2,500,000,000 you have another
deficit rolling along of $1,700,000,000, unless you do something about it then,
as I told you gentlemen when we first met in December, you are pursuing such
an improvident and unwise course that I think you threaten the credit of the
Government itself."y
See testimony of economists quoted in report, "pura,-n. 8
tO Supra n. 9 at 1. Italics writer's.
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adjusted-service certificates would supply that need by distributing $2,000,000,000 or more of actual money throughout
every part of the country.'"
Conceding that the Legal Tender Cases uphold the power of
Congress to print and issue such currency, the gift of it to the
veterans must be justified, if at all, under the power to raise and
support armies. The problem would not be different if the original plan had contemplated immediate rather than postponed payment. It may be treated as if the proposal were the only one ever
made; that Congress as the first and last measure in recognition
of military services proposes to make a gift to the veterans in
currency specially issued for the purpose.
If it be true that
Congress has the power to confer a bonus to some extent, under
some conditions, does it follow that it has unlimited power to any
extent and under all conditions?
As has been indicated, the orthodox statement is that the
court will not judge of the necessity and propriety of an act of
Congress within its conceded sphere of express powers.
It is
submitted that the court, in reality, did form its own judgments
of necessity and propriety in the child-labor cases, although the
opinions therein do not proceed upon that ground. If this interpretation of them is sound, the cases lend support to the proposition that the court may also exercise its own judgment as to the
necessity and propriety of veterans' legislation.
In Hammer v. Dagenhart,' the question was: "is it within
the authority of Congress in regulating commerce among the
states to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of
manufactured goods," the product of child labor? It was held
not, upon the ground that the evil, if any, took place before the
commerce began and that the products themselves were harmless.
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented, stating that it was enough if
interstate commerce "encourages" the evil. Although neither the
majority nor the minority relied upon the "necessary and proper"
clause, Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion indicates that he thought the
act was justified as a necessary and proper means of carrying out
the power of Congress, thus:
"But I had thought that the propriety of the exercise of a
power admitted to exist in some cases was for the consideraSITbid., at 8.
c3 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
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tion of Congress alone, and that this court always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of
policy or morals. It is not for this court to pronounce when
prohibition is necessary to regulation, if it ever may be necessary, - to say that it is permissible as against strong drink,
but not as against the product of ruined lives."

This case was later approved in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Company.' There Congress attempted to impose a tax of ten
per cent of the net profits of the year upon an employer of child
labor. It was sought to uphold the act under. Congress' broad
power of taxation. Chief Justice Taft remarked that " .. a
court-must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed
to stop the employment of children within the age limit prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are
palpable. All others see and understand this.
How can we
properly shut our minds to it?"
After stating that the power of Congress is not limited because of an incidental motive in connection with the tax, the
court said that " .... there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character
as such and becomes a mere penalty....." The court quoted
from McCullough v. Maryland that Congress could not accomplish objects not intrusted to the government "under the pretext
of executing its powers."
In both cases there is the rationalizing principle, namely,
an interference with powers of local concern left by the C6nstitution to the States. The acts were considered to be not "nedessary and proper" methods of executing the express powers to
regulate commerce and to impose taxes.
It might be argued, with some show of logic, that the real intent and purpose of the Patman Bill, as shown by the Congressional debates and reports, is not to carry out the power to raise
and support armies by means of conferring a bonus, but to accomplish an entirely unrelated object: relief from economic depression. If so, it might be a perversion of the power and subject to the same objections raised against the taxing power in
Pailiay v. Drexel. Lumber Company. However, the Patman Bill
has a double purpose -which was non-existent in the latter case
except by way of camouflage. The constitutional objection to the
bill must therefore center not upon a perversion of an express
£259 U. S.20,42 S. Ct. 449 (1922).
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power in order to accomplish objects not entrusted to Congress,
but upon inherent limitations of degree.
As Chief Justice Taft said, after a certain point a tax ceases
This is nothing if not a
to be a tax and becomes a penalty.
limitation of degree, capable of definition by the Court. By the
same token at some point (which the writer would not undertake
to define) a bonus ceases to be a recognition of a moral obligation
for services rendered and becomes a systematic confiscation of the
assets of the government for the benefit of a special body of citizens.' The question is whether Congress can, under the power
to raise and support armies, carry the means adopted to the point
where the stability of the government -is threatened. Obviously
there must also be considered the condition of the Treasury at
the time and under the circumstances. What might be a "proper"
means under normal economic conditions may be quite improper
and inappropriate under abnormally depressed conditions. Is
this solely a question of the wisdom of the law with which the
Court is fond of saying it has no concern? In a sense it is. But
then, the Court in Bailey v. Drexel Lumber Company really passed upon the wisdom of the law, in denying the power of taxation
at the point where it ceased to be a tax and became a penalty.
No reason is perceived why the same principle should not be followed if and when the granting of bonuses is no longer really
calculated to further the legitimate end.
The Spirit of the Constitution
In his argument in McCullough v. Maryland, Pinkney said:
"All the objects of the government are national objects, and
the means are, and must be, fitted to accomplish them. These
objects are enumerated in the- constitution, and have no limits
but the constitution itself. A more perfect union is to be
' This objection has also been applied to non-service-connected disability
benefits. See speech of Lewis W. Douglas in the House of Representatives
. I challenge any man on the floor of this House
on May 3, 1932: " .
to demonstrate why a man who cannot trace his disability to his war service
and who can take care of himself, his wife, and his children is entitled to a
gratuity from his Government."
.. VolMr. Douglas continued: "All the great political philosophers ..
.prophesied the day when under a democratic
taire, Hume, and Locke .....
form of government the power of organized minorities would be greater than
the resistance of the legislative body. I submit to you that that time has
almost arrived. I submit to you that you and I and every one of us, Members of this House, at one time or another -have been propagandized by an
organized minority, which through ignorance has unwittingly attempted to
impose upon the United States Government a burden which that Government
should never have been called upon to bear."
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formed; justice to be established; domestic tranquility insured; the common defense provided for; the general welfare
promoted; the blessings of liberty secured to the present
generation, and to posterity."

Seventeen express powers are conferred upon Congress."
Does it have authority to select one of them (the power to raise
and support armies) and exercise it to the extent of destroying
the stability of the government's finances whereby the exercise of
the remaining sixteen powers is rendered impossible? If this be
true, then the Constitution contains within itself the seeds of its
own destruction, - that is to say, the Constitution as the basis
of our government. If the whole structure be pulled down by insolvency so that there is no government in fact, then the Constitution ceases to be a living instrument and becomes an historical oddity; a venerable piece of paper. It becomes a mere scribble saying solemnly that thus and so is a government created
which in fact was not able to exist. And while it is certainly a
truism that to destroy the original document is not to destroy
the government, the reverse seems to have been overlooked.
So, there is here recorded a formal objection to construing
one express power of Congress as a rationalizing basis with which
to justify the will of the majority of that body at the expense of
the nation as a whole, when carried to a degree which undermines
the national stability. It is some such feeling that has given rise
to the expression "the spirit of the Constitution". In common
with all spirits it is a nebulous thing and perhaps makes its
habitat only in the minds of judges who speak of it. It must
arise out of the fundamental objects and purposes for which a
people organize a government. Marshall spoke of it in McCullougA v. Maryand. He "did not regard the Constitution as a
compact between the States; if a compact at all, it was a compact
among individuals, a social compact.' m
In Kampfer v. Hawkins ' Judge Roane said, "I now think
that the judiciary may and ought not only to refuse to execute a
law expressly repugnant to the Constitution; but also one which
is by a plain and natural construction, in opposition to the fundamental principles thereof."
Supra n. 36, at 381.

72U. S. Const, Art. 1, § 8.
73Supra n. 69, at 172.
711 Va. Cases, 20 (1793); quoted in B. P. Moore, The Supreme Court and
Unconstitutional Legislation (1913), LIV COLUmBIA UmvERsTy STUDIES IN
P0TCAL SCONCE, No. 2, p. 26.
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In Calder v. Bull,' Mr. Justice Chase made this statement:
" '... .. there are acts which the federal or state legislatures
cannot do without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments which
will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse
of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by
positive law, or to take away that security for personal liberty or private property for the protection whereof the government was established. An Act of the Legislature (for I
cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of
the social compact cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority.' "
But invocation of the spirit of the Constitution has been
through the medium of individual rights. There is yet to be found
a "vested right" of the people as a whole in the stability of government. Witness the case of Loan Association v. Topeka:' in
which it was said that "the theory of our gnvernments, State and
National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere."
3 Dall. 386 (1798). See also: Corwin, A Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law (1914) 12 Mice. L. REv. 247, where Chase's argument is discussed and compared with the theory of Iredell, J., that if "1 'a government
composed of legislative, executive and judicial departments were established
by a constitution which imposed no limits on the legislative power ....
whatever the legislative power chose to enact would be lawfully enacted, and
the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void.' " Professor
Corwin's view is that while in form Iredell's theory has prevailed, in substance Chase's has been accepted. In Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263,
12 S. Ct. 617 (1891), Mr. Justice Gray said, at 283: "In the exercise of this
general power of legislation, Congress may use any means, appearing to it
most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to the end to be accomplished, and are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution."
But, in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25 S.
Ct. 358 (1904), it was held that neither the spirit nor the preamble of the
Constitution could be invoked to invalidate the state statute providing for
compulsory vaccination.
'120 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 665 (1874). The court said: "There are linitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free
governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the
social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments
entitled to the name .....
"Of all the powers conferred upon government that of taxation is most
liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which taxation may be lawfully used and the extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited; .....
in most instances for which taxes are levied, as the support of government,
the prosecution of war, the National defense, any limitation is unsafe. The
entire resources of the people should in some instances be at the disposal of
the government .

..

"To lay with-one hand the power of the government on the property of
the citizen, and with the other to best9w it upon favored individuals to aid
private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery
because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not
legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms."
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The discussion thus transcends the bounds of formal legalism
and enters the domain of political science. There is reason to believe that the Supreme Court would make short shrift of any
argument which appealed to that science unaided by legal logic.
Certainly United States v. Sprague" so indicates. The etiquette
of judicial decision requires that it be demonstrated not only that
an act of Congress is calculated to undermine the governmental
structure but also that Congress does not have the power to do
it. It is conceivable that the question may be asked: "What if
democracy must choose between its life and the Constitution?
The answer was that the Nation's existence was paramount to
any interpretation of the written document .....
When, for example, the Court undertook to prevent the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, it was quietly but firmly brushed aside until
the guns had ceased firing. Lincoln declared that, 'Measures
otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Nation.' . . . . He would
not permit the Constitution to interfere with the purpose for
which the Constitution was framed, namely, the establishment
and maintenance of a democratic nation.' "
The Constitution was written not as a literary exercise but
as a practical means for the accomplishment of practical ends:
"the maintenance of the social order, the provision of a sound
financial system, and the establishment of conditions favorable to
the development of the economic resources of the new country.'
The system of checks and balances was to achieve an equilibrium
between the rights of the individual and the tyranny of popular
majorities.
It is not to be expected that those who drafted the Constitution envisioned the day when individual interests might possibly
be of less importance than collective interests. Yet unquestionably today the fundamental guaranties of individual interests
are, in a quite realistic way, dependent upon the stability of governmental machinery. We have not reached the point in legal
thinking where the court has recognized that the nation, the intangible aggregate of persons, has a "vested right" in the stability of government. If such a concept were created it would be
a simple matter to hold that Acts of Congress which were reasonably certain to destroy it, were not "necessary and proper". The
0282 U. S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 220, 221 (1931).
Supra n. 63, at 215.
79 Chas. A. Beard, The Sup'reme Court and the Constitution (1922) 79.
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collective right would then rise to the level of those "secured by
fundamental law".
The view is, therefore, here advanced that Congress has not
unlimited power to undermine the stability of the government
under the guise of raising and supporting armies for the reason
that to do so is contrary to the fundamental purposes of all governments, to achieve which the Constitution is itself a mere instrumentality. It should again- be emphasized that no opinion is
here expressed as to whether or not the proposed veterans' legislation proceeds to the subversive degree mentioned. The point is
made that, in the opinion of capable observers, it is rapidly being approached, if not, indeed, arrived at.
Suppose that the bald proposition is presented to the Supreme Court: choose between a doctrine of unlimited power and
the preservation of the government. Could it be possible that the
choice must depend upon an interpretation of the Constitution
merely as a written document, a piece of paper? It quite obviously has no forces within itself. It is the written evidence of basic
political principles to which an aggregate of individuals has
agreed to conform its actions. The principles have force and effect only so long as practice conforms to precept. The written
Constitution serves as a logical justification, convincing and persuading the mind to acquiesce in the action of those in whom the
power of action has been reposed: Congress. When, therefore,
its action becomes, in character and degree, such that the Constitution no longer serves as a logical justification and persuasion,
compelling the mind to acquiesce in such action, it becomes "unconstitutional" in a political sense. That is to say, in the sense
that the action becomes truly subversive of the objects and purposes for which government exists.
It becomes unconstitutional in legal theory only upon strictly logical demonstration. It has been indicated that as to express
powers exercised directly, the idea of limitless sovereignty within
a limited field precludes any possibility of interference with the
A distinction has been made as to express
will of Congress.
powers exercised indirectly upon the ground that the method of
indirection is limited by the requirements of necessity and
propriety. These requirements havq been enforced by the Snpieme Court in cases where it was shown that the proposed act
of Congress had no realistic or factual connection with the express power relied upon. The remaining question is as yet unde-
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cided: -whether the absence of relation between the means and the
end is the only sort of impropriety that can be recognized; or,
whether lack of propriety may' consist in carrying otherwise
justifiable legislation to a degree which endangers the structure
and stability of the government. The possibility of judicial
recognition of this principle was implied in Judge Cardozo's dissenting opinion in People v. Westchester National Bank::
"Others, again, may think that, for the sake of the economic
or financial stability of the Commonwealth, losses already
suffered should be left to lie where they have fallen. These
are questions of political or legislative expediency. I make
no attempt to answer them. I am not to substitute my judgment for the judgment of the lawmakers.
"We are warned that the recognition of this equity may be
followed by the recognition of others still weaker and more
.I am not swerved by these forebodings. I
rarefied .....
do not know the equity that is incapable of being reduced to
an absurdity when extended by some process of analogy to
varying conditions. Here, as often in the law, the difference
between right and wrong is a difference of degree..... But
the existence of a power is not refuted by demonstrating the
opportunity for its abuse. The abuse must be dealt with
when it arises."
If, under the theory mentioned, veterans' legislation could
be carried to an unconstitutional degree, it is a very serious question whether the point is anything but academic. In Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Same (two cases)' it was asserted that the Federal Maternity Act was unconstitutional. The
court held that neither the State nor an individual could raise
the question. There was no showing of any direct injury, sufThe
fered or threatened, not common to the public in general.
the
official
such
as
whether
a
public
however,
do
not
decide
cases,
Secretary of the Treasury could refuse to carry out the provisions
of an act of Congress upon the ground of unconstitutionality. In
the state cases, there is a division of authority upon the question
whether a public official having no personal or pecuniary interest
involved may, in proceedings by mandamus, justify his refusal
upon constitutional grounds.' The exigencies of the case might
'Supra n. 30.
Italics writer's.
262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923).
See note to State ex rel. Clinton Falls Nursery Co. v. Steele County Board
of Commissioners, 232 N. W. 737 (Minn. 1930), discussed in (1931) 15 1INN.
L. REv. 340. See also, Coller, UnconstitutinalitV of Statute as Defense to
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well influence the Supreme Court of the United States to uphold
the right to raise the question.
As a practical matter, one might conclude that the whole
situation is impossible; that if and when proposed legislation
reached the degree of unsoundness at the point where competent
economists could not differ, Congress would not enact the law.
Perhaps. But then, is it not a startling thing that one-fourth of
governmental expenditures should be devoted to such purposes?
Again, perhaps. Assuming that the concept has validity, what
result? Strict legal logic gives no satisfactory answer one way
or the other. It says, on the one hand: the power of Congress
within its recognized sphere is unlimited, by the very nature of
a sovereign government. It replies, on the other hand: even a
sovereign cannot destroy itself, directly or indirectly, for this is
opposed to the primary objects for which government is established.
In any event, the democratic principle cannot be strengchened
by leaning upon the arm of the Supreme Court. This, and other
platitudes, have perished in the fires of practical politics only to
rise, Phoenix-like from the ashes, to plague us. And it is probable
that we regard them as platitudes for much the same reason that
the dear old lady found Shakespeare full of familiar quotations.
Finally, it should be made clear that the foregoing discussion
is not offered as a prophecy of what the Supreme Court would hold,
but rather as a demonstration of what it could (and, it is submitted)
ought to hold, without doing violence to reason or to "reinterpreted" precedents. The task involves a recurrence to the fundamental
principles set forth in Hepburn v. Griswold, which still have vitality notwithstanding the lip-service paid to the Legal Tender Cases.
Mandamus Against a Publio Officer to Enforce said Statute. (1911) 72 CENT.
L. J. 301, at 306: 11 ..... it seems useless for the courts to have a hard
and fast principle, going beyond denial of right by any officer to plead unconstitutionality when the performance of the ministerial act, performance of
which he resists, is of great public consequence . . . . There is really 1o
great reason why a mere rule of practice should be unbending, when public

interest is at stake."

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1933

27

